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TORT LAW-TO BE OR NOT TO BE: THE WRONGFUL LIFE
CAUSE OF ACTION-Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220, 643 P.2d
954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
INTRODUCTION
"To be or not to be" 1-a dilemma Shakespeare's Hamlet
struggled with centuries ago. Now it seems American courts must
also resolve this question. The action for "wrongful life," once un-
known, is fast becoming a common cause of action. More than
sixty wrongful life cases have been decided with more than one-
third of these cases occurring since 1976.2 The essence of a wrong-
ful life cause of action is the allegation that due to the negligence
of another, birth occurred.3 Wrongful life suits are to be distin-
guished from "wrongful birth" or "wrongful pregnancy" cases in
that the former are actions brought by the child, whereas the latter
refer to suits in which the parents of the child have brought suit
against a negligent third party.4 Wrongful life actions have served
as a vehicle for a diverse group of child plaintiffs, including un-
wanted healthy children, 5 unwanted and healthy illegitimate chil-
dren,6 planned children born with birth defects, and defective
children whose birth or conception was unwanted.8 These child
plaintiffs have attempted suits against negligent doctors, lab tech-
nicians, and even their own parents who have allowed them a life
in an impaired state rather than no life at all.9 Although wrongful
1. Charlton, The First Folio of Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Act
III, Scene I, 773 (1st ed. 1968).
2. See Note, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L.
REV. 65 (1981); Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable for the Wrongful
Birth of a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. REV. 1311 (1982).
3. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
4. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1980).
5. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
6. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945.
7. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
8: Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979).
9. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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birth actions generally have been allowed, only recently have the
courts recognized the wrongful life action and only then when
brought by children who are handicapped physically or mentally. 10
Traditionally, the court's disapproval of these actions has stemmed
from: 1) their refusal to recognize the birth, itself, as a legal injury,
and 2) the perceived impossibility of computing damages." Yet, in
1980, the California Court of Appeals in Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories2 held that the wrongful life claim did state a legally
cognizable cause of action and that the child could receive general
damages, such as pain and suffering, special damages resulting
from the impaired condition, and even punitive damages.' s
Curlender is important in the evolution of the wrongful life action
and its recognition by the courts. Recently its holding was clarified
by Turpin v. Sortini." Turpin still allows the impaired child to
bring the suit, but limits the child's damages to special damages
for any extraordinary expenses necessary to provide care for the
child.' 5 Turpin exemplifies the recognition of the wrongful life ac-
tion by courts among other tort actions available to an injured
party. Because the wrongful life cause of action has only recently
been established, new cases from other jurisdictions become impor-
tant and persuasive to courts dealing with this problem for the
first time. Wrongful birth cases have already been decided in Vir-
ginia,' 6 South Carolina, 7 Tennessee,' 8 and Kentucky,' 9 and inevi-
tably North Carolina will also be faced with a wrongful birth and/
or a wrongful life suit. Therefore, an in depth analysis of the Tur-
pin decision in relation to North Carolina law is essential to enable
courts and practitioners to meet the challenge of a wrongful life
suit. This cause of action must be viewed in light of traditional tort
liability, parent-child immunity, and current judicial decisions re-
flecting the attitude that in every situation some life is not always
preferable to no life at all. Hamlet wrestled with whether to be or
not to be; today, modern courts struggle because a child is and per-
10. Id. at 486.
11. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
12. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
13. Id.
14. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
15. Id. at 348-49.
16. Naccash v. Burger, - Va. -, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
17. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.C.S.C. 1980).
18. Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.E.2d 870 (Tenn. App. 1974).
19. Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971).
[Vol. 5:435
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haps never should have been.
THE CASE
The events leading to the Turpin v. Sortini20 decision began
on September 24, 1976, when James and Donna Turpin, acting on
the advice of their pediatrician, brought their first-and at the
time their only-daughter, Hope, to the Leon S. Peter Rehabilita-
tion Center at the Fresno Community Hospital for evaluation of a
possible hearing defect. 21 Hope was examined and tested by Adam
J. Sortini, a licensed professional specializing in the diagnosis and
treatment of speech and hearing defects. The Turpins contended
that Sortini and others at the hospital negligently tested and eval-
uated Hope and incorrectly advised her pediatrician that her hear-
ing was within normal limits when actually she was completely
deaf as a result of an hereditary ailment.22 Before learning of
Hope's true condition and relying on Sortini's diagnosis, the
Turpins conceived a second child, Joy, who suffered from the same
total deafness as Hope. Had the Turpins known of Hope's heredi-
tary deafness, they would not have conceived Joy.23 The nature of
Hope's ailment and now Joy's, is such that there is a "reasonable
degree of medical probability" that the hearing defect would be
inherited by any offspring of James and Donna.24 Thus, the negli-
gence of the doctors denied the Turpins the opportunity to make
an informed decision about whether to have other children.
Based on these facts, each member of the Turpin family,
James, Donna, Hope, and Joy, brought a cause of action jointly
against Sortini, the hospital and the rehabilitation center. The only
cause before the California court on appeal was brought on behalf
of Joy and sought:
(1) general damages for being "deprived of the fundamental right
of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being without
total deafness" and (2) special damages for the "extraordinary ex-
penses the specialized teaching, training and hearing equipment"
which she will incur during her lifetime as a result of her hearing
impairment.25
20. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
21. Id. at 339.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
1983]
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Thus, the only question on appeal was whether a child born
with an hereditary affliction may maintain a tort action against a
medical professional who, before the child's conception, negligently
failed to advise the child's parents of the possibility of the heredi-
tary condition, depriving them of the opportunity to Choose not to
conceive the child.26 Until Curlender, the overwhelming majority
of decisions in all jurisdictions recognized the right of the parents
to maintain an action, and uniformly denied the child's right to
bring what is now termed a "wrongful life" action.27 Curlender
concluded that an afflicted child could bring such an action and
could recover general as well as special damages.28 In the present
case, a different panel of the California Court of Appeals disagreed
with the holding in Curlender and affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion to dismiss the child plaintiff's cause of action.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the injured
child could sue the negligent medical care provider but could only
recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary
to treat the hereditary ailment.29 In denying the child's claim for
pain and suffering or other general damages, the Court stated that:
(1) it is simply impossible to determine in any rational or rea-
soned fashion whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury
in being born impaired rather than not being born, and 2) even if
it were possible to overcome the first hurdle, it would be impossi-
ble to assess general damages in any fair nonspeculative
manner.
30
The California Supreme Court also clarified an incredible idea
that the Curlender court had stated in dictum.3 ' The Curlender
court had suggested that in an appropriate case the parents of a
seriously impaired child who with knowledge of the child's condi-
tion made a conscious choice to proceed with pregnancy could be
held liable "for the pain, suffering and misery which they had
wrought upon their offspring,"32 imposing in effect a legal duty to
abort the pregnancy. The Turpin court, by construing a legislative
26. Id. at 338.
27. 31 Cal. 3d at 223, 643 P.2d at 955, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 340.
30. Id. at 346.
31. See Wrongful Life: The Implications of Suits in Wrongful Life Brought
by Children Against Their Parents, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 411 (1981).
32. 106 Cal. App. at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
[Vol. 5:435
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response to the Curlender dictum, stated that although the child
might sue a negligent third party, a recent California statute pre-
vented a defective child from instituting an action against his par-
ents for either deciding to conceive or failing to abort.33 Both Tur-
pin and Curlender are landmark cases recognizing a child's right
to maintain an action for wrongful life. These cases were decided
by using decisions from many other jurisdictions; therefore a
knowledge of cases from other parts of the country is necessary to
understand the impact of the Turpin decision.
BACKGROUND
The term "wrongful life" first appeared in 1963 in the Illinois
appellate court opinion of Zepeda v. Zepeda3 4 The court denied
recovery to a child plaintiff who claimed that his defendant father
had injured him by causing him to be born illegitimate. The court
stated that the creation of a "wrongful life" cause of action would
encourage suits by others born into the world under conditions
they might regard as adverse. "One might seek damages for being'
of a certain color, another because of race, one for being born with
an hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family
characteristics." 5 Certainly the Illinois court did not realize that
what they were asserting as preposterous would someday actually
be a recognized cause of action. Just as it seemed unlikely then
that children would be able to sue for being born with an heredi-
tary disease, today it seems unlikely that a child might be able to
sue because he has been born of a particular race. Yet with Turpin
signaling the continued viability of the wrongful life cause of ac-
tion, it very well may be possible for a child to sue for the other
reasons mentioned by the Zepeda court.
The Zepeda holding was followed by a New York court in
Williams v. State. 6 The child plaintiff's mother was raped while in
33. CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982); Section 43.6 reads in full: (a) No cause
of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child
should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to
have been born alive. (b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live
birth of his or her child shall not be a defense in any action against a third party,
nor shall the failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages in any such
action. (c) As used in this section 'conceived' means the fertilization of a human
ovum by a human sperm.
34. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
35. Id. at 858.
36. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966).
1983] 439
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a state mental institution. Plaintiff's claim was that the institu-
tion's neglect gave rise to the rape resulting in his birth. The court
refused recovery to the child, observing that "being born under one
set of circumstances rather than another. . . is not a suable wrong
that is cognizable in court.""7
The first "wrongful life" action in which the term was accu-
rately applied to claims brought by an impaired child was
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,38 decided in 1967 by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court. Mrs. Gleitman had contracted rubella during the
first trimester of pregnancy and chose to continue the pregnancy
on the repeated and erroneous assurances by her physician that
the rubella would not affect her unborn child. Subsequently, Mrs.
Gleitman gave birth to a child who was deaf, mute, nearly blind
and possibly retarded. 39 The majority barred recovery by either the
parents or the child on two grounds: 1) the perceived impossibility
of computing damages, and 2) public policy.40 The court explained
that "damages are measured by comparing the condition plaintiff
would have been in, had the defendants not been negligent, with
plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the negligence. The in-
fant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life
with defects against the utter void of nonexistence ... " The
court also saw any decision negating the value of life directly or
impliedly impermissible by public policy.42 Yet, the dissent in
Gleitman demonstrated a change in attitude, recognizing that the
majority's refusal of recovery "permits a wrong with serious conse-
quential injury to go wholly unredressed." With regard to the im-
possibility of computing damages, the dissent, citing Story Parch-
ment Co. v. Paterson Co.," countered that this difficulty cannot be
permitted to justify a denial of liability.45 Nevertheless, the reason-
ing and result of Gleitman has been generally followed by other
jurisdictions. 48
37. Id. at 344.
38. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
39. Id. at 690.
40. Id. at 692.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 703.
44. 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
45. 49 N.J. at __, 227 A.2d at 704.
46. See Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital, 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296
N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d
440 [Vol. 5:435
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Soon after these cases, the United States Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade4 recognized the constitutionally protected right of
mothers to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of preg-
nancy, free of state interference. Surely, this determination played
a significant part in the recognition of the wrongful life action be-
cause shortly after Roe, in 1979, the New Jersey Supreme Court
retreated somewhat from the Gleitman holding, finding in Berman
v. Allen 48 that at least the parents of the impaired child had a
cause of action and could recover damages. 49 The facts of Berman
v. Allen were that Mrs. Berman had become pregnant in her late
thirties. Her age, in itself, created the risk that the child might be
born with Down's syndrome which is generally characterized by
mental retardation. An established technique for discerning birth
defects in utero, amniocentesis, had not been suggested to the
Bermans. The use of this technique would have given the Bermans
the ability to make an informed decision whether to give birth to a
retarded child or to abort. When Sharon Berman was born, she
was retarded, and the court allowed her parents to recover dam-
ages for emotional distress.50 The dissenting opinion in Berman
found it inconsistent to allow only the parents recovery and not
the child because "the child . . . was owed. . . a duty of reasona-
ble care from the same physicians who undertook to care for its
mother .... "5 Since abortion has been recognized by the na-
tion's highest court as a constitutional right, there is consequently
a duty on the part of the medical profession to advise parents of
possible defects so they can make an informed decision about the
child's existence or nonexistence. 2
The Roe decision also had a great impact on the New York
courts although its effect was short-lived. In Parks v. Chessin,53 an
intermediate New York appellate court was willing to recognize the
right of a child to bring action for wrongful life. The Parks had
previously had a child who died from polycystic kidney disease, a
fatal hereditary ailment. They were assured by the defendant doc-
tors that the first child's condition was not hereditary and that the
373 (1975).
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 18.
53. 60 A.D. 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
1983]
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chances of a second child being born with the same ailment were
nil. 54 Relying on the doctor's opinions, the Parks had a second
child who was also born with the disease and who lived only for
two and a half years. This New York court viewed the constitu-
tional right of abortion to extend to instances in which it can be
determined with reasonable medical certainty that the child would
be born deformed; thus, "[tihe breach of this right may also be
said to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as
a whole, functional human being. '5 5 This court thought it espe-
cially important that decisional law keep pace with expanding
technological, economic, and social change.56
Although Parks seemed to indicate that a wrongful life suit in
New York might be gaining viability, this indication was incorrect.
One year later, in Becker v. Schwartz,57 the Parks decision was
reviewed and overruled. The Beckers and their mongoloid infant
sought damages from medical doctors who had not warned the
mother of the dangers accompanying a pregnancy in later years or
informed them of amniocentesis. The infants in both Becker and
Parks, unlike their parents, were found not to have a legally cogni-
zable cause of action.58 The New York court barred recovery be-
cause of its inability to measure the value of human existence with
handicaps with that of no life at all, stating "[w]hether it is better
never to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery
more properly left to the philosophers and theologians. ' 59 Besides,
"[tihere is no precedent for fundamental right of a child to be born
as a whole, functional human being." 60 As a result of these cases,
other jurisdictions have continuously rejected the right of an in-
fant's cause of action for wrongful life. 1
The turning point occurred with the California case of
Curlender. The court noted that "there has been a gradual retreat
54. Id. at 111.
55. Id. at 114.
56. Id.
57. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
58. Id. at 412, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Note, "Wrongful Life": Should the Cause of Action be Recognized?,
70 Ky. L.J. 163, 169 (1981). See e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp.,
451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex.
1976); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Elliott v.
Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1976).
[Vol. 5:435
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from the position of accepting the 'impossibility of measuring dam-
ages' as the sole ground for barring the infant's right of recovery
.... -"62 and that public policy, instead of being a basis for deny-
ing recovery, should include regard for social welfare as affected by
careful genetic counseling and medical procedures. 3 The Court al-
lowed the infant plaintiffs cause of action because it found a duty
to unborn children by medical professionals to use ordinary care in
administration of available tests for the purpose of providing infor-
mation concerning potential genetic defects. 4 Thus, the court
found the negligence of the doctors as the proximate cause of the
child's birth, stating that "[t]he injury, of course, is not the partic-
ular defect with which a plaintiff is afflicted . but it is the birth
of the plaintiff with such a defect.""
Possibly, the Curlender court's boldness to break from the
holdings of earlier cases is due to the facts of that particular case.
In 1977, Phillis and Hyam Curlender retained the Bio-Science
Laboratories to administer certain tests to reveal whether either of
them were carriers of an hereditary condition known as Tay-Sachs
disease. 6 Due to Bio-Science Laboratories' negligence, they were
assured that they were non-carriers and as a result had a child.
The child, Shauna, suffered from Tay-Sachs disease-a result they
had specifically sought to avoid.6 7 Shauna's life expectancy was
roughly four years. She suffered from mental retardation, suscepti-
bility to other diseases, convulsions, sluggishness, apathy, failure to
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 488.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 480.
67. Tays-Sachs is a:
fatal progressive degenerative disease of the nervous system which pri-
marily affects the Eastern European Jewish population and their prog-
eny. Only in the circumstances where both parents are carriers will there
be a great likelihood of the presence of the disease in the offspring. In
1969, a relatively simple test to reveal carriers was developed, requiring
only a blood sample. Parents-to-be, if individually tested and both found
to be carriers, could then agree to a second test. Such second test [known
as amniocentesis] involved the drawing and testing of amniotic fluid
from the sac in which the unborn child rests within the mother. With the
information that their child would be born suffering from this fatal dis-
ease, parents could make an informed, although difficult, decision as to
whether to continue or terminate the pregnancy.
Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 114, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366, 366 N.E.2d 54
(1977).
1983] 443
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fix objects with her eyes, inability to take an interest in her sur-
roundings, loss of motor reactions, inability to sit up or hold her
head up, loss of weight, muscle atrophy, blindness, pseudobulper
palsy, inability to feed orally, decerebrate rigidity and gross physi-
cal deformity."6 8 Previous rhetoric by courts 9 that "life-whether
experienced with or without a major physical handicap-is more
precious than nonlife' ' 70 loses its effect in light of what this child
suffered because of the negligence of others. The Curlender court
explained that "the reality of the 'wrongful life' concept is that
such a plaintiff both exists and suffers (original emphasis) due to
the negligence of others, ' 71 and, in turn, this plaintiff is justifiably
entitled to recover general, special and possibly punitive dam-
ages.72 Thus, through Curlender, the Turpin Court was able to
continue the child's wrongful life cause of action.
ANALYSIS
The Turpin decision is of great importance to all states which
have not dealt with the wrongful life issue because it represents
the first time the highest court of a state has allowed a child to sue
for damages for its wrongful life due to the negligence of another.
The earlier Curlender decision by the California Court of Appeals
held that the defective child had a cause of action by rejecting "the
notion that a 'wrongful life' cause of action involves any attempted
evaluation of a claimed right not to be born. '73 This notion of a
right not to be born has prevented other courts from recognizing
the wrongful life action.7 4 Yet, the Turpin Court found the refusal
to recognize a preference for nonexistence over existence in certain
situations as the basic fallacy of the Curlender analysis.7 In Tur-
pin, the Court realized the critical difference between wrongful life
68. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
69. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
70. 80 N.J. at -, 404 A.2d at 12-13.
71. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
72. Id. at 488-490.
73. Id. at 489-90.
74. See e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Schroeder
v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432*A.2d 834 (1981); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d
8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978);
Speck v. Finegold, - Pa. -, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975).
75. 31 Cal. 3d at 234, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
[Vol. 5:435
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and the ordinary prenatal injury cases. For instance, in a prenatal
injury suit, the child, but for the doctor's negligence, would have
been born healthy. In wrongful life cases, if the defendant doctor
had performed his job properly,. the child would not have been
born at all.76 Therefore, a wrongful life claim does not suggest that
the physician could only have prevented the injury by preventing
the birth.
Most courts have concluded that to recognize birth as a legally
cognizable injury would contravene the most sacred of public poli-
cies: life, even with the most severe impairments, is preferable to
no life at all." Yet, the California Supreme Court in Turpin with
daring boldness, was able to frankly admit that this sentiment is
not always the truth:
Considering the short life span of many of these children and
their frequently very limited ability to perceive or enjoy the bene-
fits of life, we cannot assert with confidence that in every situa-
tion there would be a societal consensus that life is preferable to
never having been born at all.7 8
Yet, the Turpin Court is only reaching the same conclusions other
courts have reached in determining that nonexistence is sometimes
preferable over existence. In Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz,79 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts al-
lowed a mentally incompetent person suffering from leukemia to
choose nonexistence by refusing medical treatment. Similarly, in
Matter of Quinlan,80 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
right of the incompetent in a persistent comatose state to choose
nonexistence over continued existence would "not be discarded
solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exer-
cise of the choice.""1 These cases are similar to the concept of a
wrongful life action in that both involve beings who are incapable
of making the choice whether to exist or not at the time the deci-
sion must be made. By demonstrating that no life would be more
desirable than a life of continued pain and suffering, the courts
have recognized the right of comatose patients not to exist. The
76. Id.
77. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 812 (1979); Phillips v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (D.C.S.C. 1980).
78. 31 Cal. 3d at 234, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
79. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
80. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
81. Id. at 664.
19831
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child in a wrongful life suit is also asking the court to recognize
this right not to exist. Because the child exists through the negli-
gence of others, he is entitled to damages for unnecessary pain and
suffering. This idea of a right not to exist would only be demon-
strated by overcoming the strong burden that nonlife is preferable
to life. Thus, this burden would still prevent illegitimate children
or mildly handicapped children from suing their parents or doctors
for their birth.
The second major problem courts have had with recognizing
wrongful life actions, besides recognizing a right not to exist, is the
computation of damages. The Curlender court allowed general
damages for pain and suffering, special damages, and stated that
punitive damages would also be allowed if appropriate.8 2 Turpin,
on the other hand, modified this rule so that the child could only
recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary
to treat the hereditary ailment."3 Thus, in effect, the Turpin deci-
sion continues the Curlender rule, but lessens its harshness by lim-
iting the damages recoverable. The court held that because of the
peculiar nature of a wrongful life claim "it would be impossible to
assess general damages in any fair, nonspeculative manner. '"" In
Turpin, the Court asserted that there is a profound qualitative dif-
ference between the difficulties faced by a jury in assessing general
damages in a personal injury or wrongful death action and its task
in assessing general damages in a wrongful life case.85 One judge
explained in Speck v. Finegold while dealing with this concept that
"[w]hen a jury considers the claim of a once-healthy plaintiff that
a defendant's negligence harmed him-for example, by breaking
his arm-the jury's ability to say that the plaintiff has been 'in-
jured" is manifest, for the value of a healthy existence over an im-
paired existence is within the experience or imagination of most
people."" The problem these courts are essentially facing is that in
tort cases the jury generally compares the condition the plaintiff
would have been in but for the tort with the position the plaintiff
is in now.87 The position the wrongful life plaintiff would be in if
the tort had not occurred is an area "outside the realm of human
82. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
83. 31 Cal. 3d at 239, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
84. Id. at 346.
85. Id.
86. Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. at -, 408 A.2d at 512 (1979) (Spaeth,
J. concurring and dissenting), aff'd 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
87. 31 Cal. 3d at 236, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
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competence." 8
Nevertheless, it appears inconsistent to recognize the tort, and
find the doctors negligent, but deny damages simply because of the
difficulty in ascertaining them. This result certainly undermines
public policy by permitting a "wrong with serious consequential in-
jury to go wholly unredressed." 89 Even the Turpin Court, when
finding a basis not to reject the tort action, stated "it is hard to see
how. . . or in any way suggest that the child is not entitled to the
full measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to
all members of society."'9 Jurors are called upon each day to mea-
sure what a plaintiff's normal life would have been without pain
and suffering. 91 In essence, they are placing a monetary value on
this pain and suffering with the normal life as given. If the child
plaintiff in a wrongful life action is entitled to the full measure of
legal rights, these same jurors also must be called upon to value
her pain and suffering against its absence had she never been born.
Yet, the Turpin Court anticipates this argument and gives an-
other ground on which to deny general damages. Section 920 of the
Restatement Second of Torts provides that when the defendant's
tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff and in so doing
has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff, the
value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of dam-
ages.92 Thus under the "benefit" doctrine, the Turpin court found
that "as an incident of defendant's negligence the plaintiff has in
fact obtained a physical existence with the capacity both to receive
and give love and pleasure." 93 Because of this benefit as a mitigat-
ing factor and the extraordinary speculative nature of the general
damages, any award of general damages must be denied." Special
damages, such as medical expenses, on the other hand were readily
ascertainable and would not have been incurred but for the doc-
tor's negligence. Thus "while the law cannot remove the heartache
or undo the harm, it can afford some reasonable measure of com-
pensation toward alleviating the financial burdens."9
88. Id.
89. 49 N.J. at -, 227 A.2d at 703.
90. 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
91. Id. at 347.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 950 (1979).
93. 31 Cal. 3d at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 348 (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at -, 227 A.2d at 703).
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POINTERS FOR PRACTITIONERS
A consideration for counsel representing a child plaintiff in a
wrongful life action against his parents is whether the jurisdiction
in which the cause of action arose or in which the suit is filed rec-
ognizes the doctrine of immunity which prevents parents from be-
ing sued by their unemancipated children.96 Because the Curlender
decision suggested that parents should be answerable for the pain,
suffering, and misery which they have brought upon their off-
spring,97 the California legislature passed a statute to prevent this
type of action.98 Other jurisdictions which have abolished parental
immunity and do not have such a statute may in the near future
be faced with such a wrongful life action. North Carolina, however,
still adheres to the traditional parent-child immunity doctrine that
an unemancipated minor child may not maintain an action against
his parent to recover damages for negligence. 99 Yet, the legislature
has recently passed a statute abolishing parent-child immunity in
motor vehicles cases, thereby permitting a child who survives mo-
tor vehicle-related injuries to maintain an action against the negli-
gent parent."'0 This statute may signal the beginning of a slow abo-
lition of the common law rule of parental immunity, so counsel for
the child plaintiff in a wrongful life action suit may someday be
able to sue the child's parent who allows the defective child to be
born.101
Secondly and more probable is the possibility that practition-
ers in North Carolina may represent a child plaintiff in a wrongful
life action against a negligent medical professional. In North Caro-
lina, a physician is required to possess that degree of professional
knowledge and skill which others similarly situated ordinarily pos-
sess and to exercise reasonable care and diligence of his knowledge
and skill for the patient's care.10 2 A physician may be held liable
for injuries resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable dili-
gence though he possesses the requisite professional knowledge.103
Generally, in an action for malpractice, the burden is upon the
96. Annot., Tort Liability For Wrongful Birth, 83 A.L.R.3d 15, 25 (1978).
97. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
98. See supra, note 33.
99. Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1981); see also Snow v. Nixon, 52 N.C. App.
131, 227 S.E.2d 850 (1981).
101. See supra, note 31.
102. Wiggins v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
103. Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973).
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plaintiff to prove by the greater weight of the evidence not only
that the defendant was negligent, but that such negligence was the
proximate cause of her injury.10 4 Thus, in North Carolina before a
wrongful life action can be maintained, the courts must be willing
to find the birth, itself, a legal injury, a finding refused by other
jurisdictions. 105 This determination would be basically a public
policy consideration. North Carolina courts would necessarily look
to decisions of neighboring states such as Virginia and South Caro-
lina. In Phillips v. United States,"° a federal district court held
that there was no controlling decision in South Carolina governing
the wrongful life claim, but held that if the South Carolina Su-
preme Court were presented with such an issue it would decline to
recognize such a claim on the basis of public policy.10 7 This court's
decision loses much of its weight through the second Phillips' de-
cision which allowed the wrongful birth action based on similar
public policies on which it had rejected the wrongful life claim. In
both Phillips cases, the only injury was the birth of a severely af-
flicted child. Likewise in Virginia, in Naccash v. Burger,10 9 a child
was born with Tay-Sachs disease (the same disease possessed by
Shauna in Curlender), through the negligence of lab technicians
who mislabeled the blood of the father. The court stated that the
final link essential to the recognition of a cause of action is the
existence of actionable injury. It found direct injury: 1) by depriv-
ing the parents of the opportunity to accept or reject the continu-
ance of the pregnancy, and 2) by the birth of the fatally defective
child. 10 Thus, if North Carolina courts follow the trend of previous
decisions, they will recognize the wrongful birth cause of action. If
they also accept the concept that the birth of a fatally handi-
capped child is a legal injury due to medical negligence, then nor-
mal rules of professional liability will apply and the wrongful life
cause of action must also be recognized.
CONCLUSION
The Turpin decision is monumental in the evolution of wrong-
104. Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
105. See generally supra notes 3-11.
106. 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.C.S.C. 1980).
107. Id. at 544.
108. 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.C.S.C. 1980).
109. - Va. -, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
110. Id. at 829-30.
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ful life actions. It continues the rule established in Curlender that
the impaired child whose birth occurred as a result of the negli-
gence of another may maintain an action for damages."' Although
Turpin continues this rule of law, it lessens the harshness of its
effect by allowing the child to recover only extraordinary medical
expenses, the same type of damages recoverable by parents in
wrongful birth actions. Courts have been reluctant to allow wrong-
ful life actions because these actions necessitate a finding that non-
life is preferable to life and places damage determination in the
twilight zone. North Carolina must review carefully the reasoning
in cases of neighboring states as well as the Turpin decision. If a
child is born so severely impaired that nonexistence can be pre-
ferred over existence, then the doctor whose negligence prevented
a meaningful decision concerning whether the child "should or
should not be" must be held accountable-not only to the parents,
but also to the infant who consequently exists and suffers.11
Mary Beth Forsyth
111. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
112. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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